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Macroeconomic Impact of the Financial Crisis on Armenia
King Banaian, St. Cloud State University*
ABSTRACT: As a small, open economy with a small export sector, Armenia has
experienced a large amount of stress from the financial crisis. The government
exited a peg-like exchange rate regime after a drain of foreign reserves. The loss of
reserves was put to loss of revenues from mining exports, but can also be put to the
effects of global financial crisis on remittance inflows. Worldwide, the World Bank
expects remittances to fall from US$305 billion in 2008 to $290 billion in 2009. In
this paper I explore the effect of global crisis on the loss of reserves supporting the
monetary system. Bank balance sheets expanded rapidly and, though small relative
to GDP, accepted many assets tied to real estate. Banks’ asset-liability mismatches
have their root cause in changes to the flow of hard currency brought on by the
crisis.

Fellow, Armenian International Policy Research Group. Paper to be presented at
the workshop “The impact of global crisis on Armenia: empirical evidence”, Yerevan,
9 July 2009. I thank Bryan Roberts, Armine Khachatryan, Ashot Mkrtchyan, Arman
Gabrielyan, and Aghassi Mkrtchyan for advice and assistance. I am solely
responsible for the contents herein.
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After six consecutive years of double-digit GDP growth, the Armenian economy was
caught in the downdraft of the global recession in 2008. GDP grew at a more
moderate 6.8% pace in 2008. A significant contributor to growth had been the
export of labor with the return of remittance income to Armenia. Private transfers
had grown in 2006 and 2007 but fell late in 2008, and were 32.5% below 2008
levels in January-April 2009. GDP fell 15.7% in the January-May 2009 period from
year-earlier levels and the IMF now expects GDP to contract 9.5% in 2009.1 Around
the world, remittances are down $15 billion, or about 5% from 2008 levels.
In many developing countries the expectation is for growth to continue but at a
much slower rate. After growing 6.6% in 2007 and 5.8% in 2008, the IMF expects
growth of 2.5% in 2009 and 3.8% in 2010 in the Middle East and central Asia. 2 But
in Armenia things have been much worse. On June 22, 2009 the IMF offered
additional support to the Armenian economy. Deputy Managing Director Murilo
Portugal offered this assessment:
Since the approval of the stand-by arrangement in March 2009, the external
economic outlook has deteriorated significantly for Armenia. Falling private
transfers and capital inflows have aggravated external imbalances and
affected household incomes and investor confidence. Construction activity, the
main driver of growth in previous years, has collapsed, and the economy is
experiencing a deep contraction.
The banking system began to show signs of wear as well. While no bank has failed
since the start of the recession and bank capitalization ratios are substantially
higher than prudential standards, 7.8% of bank loans were in arrears in the first
quarter of 2009, double its level from six months earlier. While the national average
is not greatly concerning, some observers believe non-performing loans on some

Nienke Oomes, IMF resident , quoted in Hasmik Mrktchyan, “Armenia GDP to
contract 9.5% -- IMF” Reuters, June 24, 2009.
2 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, April 2009.
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bank portfolios are approaching levels that threaten those banks’ capital base. To
raise capital, many banks are selling assets.
After the Central Bank of Armenia (hereinafter CBA) used a significant portion of its
reserves to maintain the peg of the Armenian dram against the U.S. dollar, the
government relented and permitted a devaluation and float of the currency on
March 2, 2009. The float was supported with a new program from the International
Monetary Fund that included a loan more than four times the size of what had been
previously contemplated for Armenia. The Fund’s own assessment of the situation
had changed dramatically in three months, with estimates of exports, remittances
and foreign direct investment slashed for 2009.
There is temptation to place Armenia’s issues in the broader context of global
financial crisis and refer to its difficulties as an example of contagion. Usually
contagion is a problem revolved around financial interconnections. Many observers
last year thought that, because the Armenian banking system has little exposure to
the international financial markets, it would weather the United States’ financial
meltdown last September rather well. But Armenia is not isolated in all economic
spheres. In particular, its goods market and its labor market are open towards
Russia, following historical connections created earlier in the 20th Century.
Much of the trouble the Armenian economy, I argue, is an example of economic
interdependence with the Russian economy. A recent report from the World Bank
finds that Russian GDP is expected to decline 7.9% in 2009 after growing 5.6% in
2008.3 Unemployment has risen from 6.4% to 9.4% in the first quarter of 2009.
The construction sector, which hires many seasonal Armenian workers, fell 21% in
the same period. (More than half of Armenian emigrant workers work in Russia.)
I explore in this paper the connection between the loss of income from remittances,
particularly from Russia, and the instability of the Armenian financial sector. I will
review Armenian banking in the next section. Growth of the sector has been heavily
managed by the Central Bank of Armenia, which has protected the sector from
excesses but may have restricted the diversification to those areas chosen by CBA. I
will then review the international sector, studying the impact of the financial crisis
on both the exports of goods and of labor from Armenia. An appraisal of the impact
of the loss of remittance income on the economy is estimated in a third section,
using both research by Banaian and Roberts [2006, 2007] and by Mkrtchyan, DablaNorris and Stepanyan [2009]. In the concluding section I offer a few thoughts on
how reforms could help insulate the Armenian economy from swings in remittance
income.
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World Bank, Russian Economic Report 19, June 2009.

Financial activities in Armenia
Financial intermediation in Armenia has been a persistent source of concern for
policymakers since the first banks were established. The presence of a large
foreign-based bank in HSBC Armenia has been a common topic for discussion, with
foreign capital in the banking system rising above 50% in 2007, while the number of
banks in the country consolidated from 74 in 1994 to 22 today. HSBC continues to
dominate the deposit business in banking, holding more than 50% of deposits in
2006 and xx% today. Dabla-Norris and Floerkemeier [2007, p. 10] testify to the
nature of the market:
Banks differ greatly in size, outreach effort, and customer base. Around half of
all Armenian banks are very small with negligible market shares in deposits
and loans, which contributes to the sector’s overall low banking productivity. A
number of these banks concentrate their activities in trade financing, money
transfers, and private banking, rather than in deposit-taking and loan-making.
Other banks serve a large number of small-scale depositors and borrowers.
While they may have comparatively large shares of the overall deposit and
credit markets, the size of financial service per customer can be extremely
small, with some banks having average loans and deposits as low as US$200
per customer.
This diversity makes it difficult to make sweeping statements about the state of the
banking system but also exposes the possibility that some banks may be much more
greatly harmed by the financial crisis than aggregate data would tell.
Intermediation has always been low, with a credit to GDP ratio of 6% at the end of
2003. Through concerted bank policy of the government (assisted by western
donor organizations), that level had risen to near 12% at the end of 2007. Such
rapid expansion of credit (over 30% per year in 2006 and 2007) would give at least
some people pause to consider loan quality. Nevertheless, because liquidity and
capital levels were so high, concerns over bank lending practices were
overshadowed by calls for greater intermediation.
Dollarization has declined dramatically in the last two years, at least in terms of
deposits. (I have no information on the level of cash dollarization.) Firms in
Armenia have long shown a preference for holding demand deposits in local
currency, but both firms and households preferred their time deposits in dollars.
But as the Armenian dram appreciated through the middle part of the decade, more
and more households were lured into the local currency even for their time
deposits. Lending to households accelerated in 2007, and most loans were
denominated in dram.4 Charts 1 and 2 show this below.
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The movement in firms is similar but less pronounced, omitted here to save space.

Charts 1 and 2. Household Loans and Deposits, Armenia 2003-08

Source: Central Bank of Armenia (CBA)

Table 1 shows the effect of the crisis on bank balance sheets. Capital and liquidity
were adequate to handle the initial crisis. But demand for foreign currency shot up
largely as a flight to safety. Asset and deposit growth stalled in the fourth quarter,

liquidity began to decline and banks started to seek additional support from foreign
investors. Demand deposits switched from dram to foreign exchange.

Table 1. Consolidated Commercial Bank Balance Sheet, 2005-2008
Cash
Reserves
Securities
Loans to firms
Loans to households
Loan loss reserves
Other assets
Total assets

2005
26984964
120411078
65576558
104216049
73789943
-3413727
53109280
440674145

2006
30570217
123608438
93623489
114550929
108972461
-4562064
57754017
524517487

2007
39091529
138938157
112190196
192424384
206255267
-7701615
83261361
764459279

2008
40968000
175138200
74766600
278734000
332837000
n/a
121756200
1024200000

Demand deposits
Households
Firms
Time Deposits
Households
Firms
Govt deposits
Other liabilities
Capital
Total Liab/NW

52577898
92537273

58826297
102147492

67943187
141869783

61503000
124583000

67071720
49151646
16275264
68299588
94760756
440674145

84719541
53911522
18063406
86677690
120171539
524517487

130082101
58618738
19303041
175065605
171576824
764459279

173470000
89100500
6308000
333535500
235700000
1024200000

capital/assets
liquidity indicator

21.50%
33.45%

22.91%
29.39%

22.44%
23.29%

23.01%
21.10%

*-2008 data from different source, approximate for Q4.
Source: 2005-2007 National Statistics Service, 2008 CBA

Loans increasingly took on longer terms, as most of these household loans went to
mortgages or automobiles. Meanwhile deposits were still relatively short term, so
that banks began to experience the possibility of intermediation spreads – banks
began to borrow short and lend long.

Source: CBA.
Reserves rose during the crisis, jumping in February 2009 to 35.8% of deposits from
18.7% in November 2008. At the same time demand for cash dram fell from 87% of
deposits to 64% in the same interval. The changes virtually offset each other in
terms of the money multiplier, and CBA held the monetary base close to year-ago
levels,

Remittances as a form of contagion or interdependence?
In an interconnected world recessions in one country can lead to difficulties in its
trading partners. Countries trade output goods and services, and inputs like labor
and capital. All of those items will be affected by changes in economic activity in one
country.

Orosco [2008] using survey data from CBA found that approximately one-third of
Armenian households receive remittances from family members abroad. On
average this comes to $1600 per household. 77% of those surveyed reported that
the money came from Russia (and another three percent from Ukraine; the largest
non-CIS country that was a source of remittances was the United States.) Most
funds were used to support current expenditures rather than saved; very little was
saved. 70% was applied to current consumption and about ten percent for
education.

Table 2. Net Migration, Armenia 2002-07
Year
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

To CIS countries
Outside CIS
8039
6315
6445
6196
5266
5013

1173
1306
1268
1612
1452
1436

Source NSS, The Demographics Handbook of Armenia 2008

Orosco estimates that the range of remittance income is between US$400 million
and US$ 1 billion, or 3.4% to 8.4% of 2008 GDP. Other estimates (Banaian and
Roberts [2006, 2007]) put the number at more than double this, and Stratfor [2009]
estimates remittances as “one-fifth” of GDP. It is worth noting that some of the
difference comes from the latter studies including migrant workers who return
within a year; they are not included in the CBA/Orosco survey due to a difference in
definitions.
Data on remittances is of course notoriously difficult. Some money comes via wire
transfer through banks and money transfer organizations (MTOs) such as
Unistream and Anelik. The flow of remittances is quite seasonal, peaking in the
third quarter. To ease perception, I have seasonally adjusted the data (using moving
averages). The fall in remittances began earlier than the decline in currency ratios
or pressure on the dram, in the fourth quarter of 2008. The data only reflects the
balances at commercial banks. For MTOs, the transactions tend to be much smaller
(average size AMD 281,000, or less than US$1000, as opposed to AMD 13.8 million
remitted via commercial banks) but far more used, and they followed a similar
pattern of stalling in the fourth quarter.

As noted above, the Russian economy has slowed dramatically since December
2008, and as a result its demand for labor from other countries has fallen. The
Russian government announced early in 2009 that it would reduce the number of
work permits given to emigrants from countries of the Commonwealth of
Independent States by half, from 4 million to 2 million. Stratfor reported that
approximately “250,000 workers are said to have left Russia, including Tajiks and
many Georgians ejected after the war with Russia in August.” Worldwide
remittances were anticipated by the World Bank to fall 5-8%. They note that the
decline was likely to be pronounced since the Russian ruble has declined by 35%
since August 2008. Nevertheless, the World Bank expects some resilience in
remittance income in part because those workers sent home may take accumulated
savings with them.5
The decline in exports of both goods and labor can be seen by noting that, between
January and April of 2009, exports were 47.8% below their levels in the first four
months of 2008 (from US$338.3 million to $175.6 million) while remittance net
inflows fell from US$318.1 million to $207.6 million in the same time periods. Of
that, the decline from Russia alone is almost the entire amount, from US$277.8
million to $173.6 million. That loss of remittance income represents a substantial
decline in the supply of foreign exchange, which may have helped pressure the
exchange rate of the AMD. The economic decline in Armenia reduced imports by
25% to US$893.5 million, however.
Dilip Ratha and Sanket Mohapatra, “Revised Outlook for Remittance Flows 20092011: Remittances expected to fall by 5 to 8 percent in 2009.” World Bank,
Migration and Development Brief 9, March 23, 2009.
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These losses represent a fundamental contagion that is the by-product of the
linkages of a more globalized economy. Liang, Willett and Zhang [2009, pp. 3-4]
explain:
There is no one generally accepted definition of contagion. All concepts have in
common, however, the general idea of developments in one market or country
affecting those in another. While contagion often carries the connotation of the
irrational transmission of shocks from one country to another, a broader
definition that is also frequently used applies to any transmission effect
including those through trade flows where a recession in one country is
transmitted to others through the real sector. Often labeled economic
interdependence, such fundamentals based contagion is perfect consistent with
fully efficient financial markets and may be considered the polar opposite of
irrational contagion transmitted through market hysteria or other types of
market inefficiency.
Between these extremes are a host of possible types of at least partially rational
transmission mechanisms operating through financial sectors. … This financial
interdependence operates similarly to trade interdependence and gives rise to
the prospect of countries being “innocent victims” of adversity in other
countries. Generally, however, these forms of contagion are relatively mild
unless a major trading partner or financial centers are involved. Thus, for
example, while the Argentine crisis of 2001-2002 had detectable influences in
markets in Asia, its major effects were on immediate neighbors. Russia’s crisis
had much broader effects because these came largely through its effects on the
major financial centers like New York…
With a relatively small financial market, the Armenian economy was not prone to
the financial contagion of the type that markets experienced in the Russian crisis.
Much of the decline in capital inflows expected in Armenia (the IMF [2009] expects
now for more than a billion U.S. dollars less capital flowing into the country due to
FDI and other private capital flows) is a consequence of the trade decline rather
than the result of financial contagion. The IMF discusses whether local banks “could
be vulnerable to liquidity problems, reflecting the fragile confidence of the public in
the banking system due to previous episodes of devaluations and bank runs in
Armenia.” (p.6) But the source of the bank disturbance comes from the decline in
dram lending, as noted above. By allowing depreciation, CBA gives the banks some
breathing room to take declining remittances and convert them to dram.

The Economic Effects of Remittance Drops
The negative effect of the Russian economic decline on Armenia can be predicted in
a number of ways. Banaian and Roberts [2007] identify four macroeconomic effects
of a decline in remittances:

1. A direct effect from lost income to households (income effect), which may
have Keynesian multiplier effects through consumption and investment;
2. An indirect effect from decreasing imports of goods as a result of their
status as luxury goods (import substitution effect);
3. An indirect effect that decreases imports due to depreciation of the
exchange rate as remittances are converted to drams (exchange rate
effect); and
4. An indirect effect in the long run from an increase in the effective labor
supply because fewer workers depart to foreign labor markets (labor
supply effect). For the purposes of looking at the effect of a temporary
shock like the Russian recession, I ignore this effect below.
Using a model developed by USAID for the Armenian Ministry of Finance it was
estimated that the direct income effect on output of an AMD 100,000 decrease in
remittances was to decrease investment and consumption each by AMD 35,000 in
the short run. The long-run effect on consumption through the multiplier was
expected to be a decrease of AMD 72,000.
A decrease in imports on the other hand would lessen the impact of a decline in
remittances on Armenian production. If households facing lower income due to
fewer remittances responded by substituting lower-costing domestic goods for
imports, output would not be as adversely affected. Banaian and Roberts identify
that decrease in imports from an AMD 100,000 decline in remittances as equaling
69,000. The exchange rate effect is much smaller in that model, perhaps no more
than AMD 18,000 in their model. All together, the impact of an AMD 100,000
decline in remittances was found to decrease GDP by AMD 20,000 in the long run.
Since it appears that remittances decreased by about US$39 million in the first four
months of 2009 versus 2008, that makes for a $7.8 million or about 3.5% decline in
GDP due to remittances. I would argue that, since that number uses only
remittances through the commercial banking system, this estimate is low but not by
too much. Though more remittances come through MTOs, their volume is likely to
be much lower. Compared to official GDP decrease of 9.7% for January-April,
remittances would explain not more than half of the decline.
For the remainder, we can turn to evidence of declining capital flows for foreign
direct investment and other private capital flows. The IMF [2009] estimates that,
besides remittances and exports, another US$589 million decline in FDI and private
capital flows over the full year, or about 4.9% of 2008 GDP. This will certainly
account for some of the additional decline. Most of this is attributable as well to the
Russian output shock, since much of FDI and private capital flows are from Russian
sources. If the drop in trade were to add 1% more to the decline in GDP (which is
perhaps a conservative estimate), it would be reasonable to assert that the Russian
shock causes most of the observed decline in output, rather than some financial
contagion.

Mkrtchyan, Dabla-Norris and Stepanyan [2009] provide a more complete model for
analysis of this issue. Using a small open economy model intended to illustrate the
impact of various monetary policy rules (in the context of CBA’s commitment to
inflation targeting), they argue regarding a remittance shock and to a shock to
foreign output. The distinction they draw between these two impacts is important.
Consumption spending should fall due to a fall in remittances if that fall is
exogenous, but it would be offset by an appreciation in the exchange rate. Overall,
the impact on consumption would be mixed. In the case of a negative foreign output
shock, however, the impact on consumption is unambiguously negative. A foreign
output shock hits domestic output and consumption faster both through lower
exports and because the home family of an emigrant sending remittances shares in
the loss of the income in the host country. The shock is more temporary if it comes
from foreign output. The implication for the Armenian economy would be a sharp
but relatively short recession, self-reversing when Russian output recovers.
Mkrtchyan, et al., note that the period of dedollarization between the middle of 2006
and end of 2007 was a period where expectations of the exchange rate moved
contrary to their model predictions:
“The sustained appreciation created expectations of a continuing currency
appreciation, and a resulting decline in the risk premium. This is also confirmed
by actual data which show a rapid growth in demand for the domestic currency
at the expense of the foreign currency.” (p. 30)
If there was a moment of irrationality in the Armenian economy it was presented in
this belief that appreciation would continue. There is little doubt that such
overconfidence played some role in the redollarization of late-2008, and that this is
contributing to the tightening of credit for dram-denominated loans.

Concluding thoughts
There is a danger in using a general story of contagion, broadly used to describe the
experience of the western economies in the last two years, to describe what is
happening in Armenia. Liang and Willett [2008, pp. 218-19] identify a difference
between contagion and interdependence as applied to global crisis. Contagion is
more common during crisis but for the most part is limited to a “few days or weeks.”
Medium-term responses from the currency and financial markets tend to be
much more differentiated, although the determinants of these more focused
medium-term responses can be quite complex, including both trade and
financial linkages and a broad range of fundamentals including financial and
political as well as economic considerations. Since information is often quite
imperfect, perception of the fundamentals can shift without any change in the
actual fundamentals themselves. Thus a crisis in one country can act as a
wake-up call that generates re-evaluations of conditions in other countries.

The difference between contagion and interdependence is important for policymakers. Contagion is a problem for which there are some solutions (though these
are limited, as recent events have shown), but interdependence begets its own
solution: market interdependence is wealth-creating, encouraging division of labor
and specialization.
Nonetheless, some policy implications of the current crisis can be drawn:
 I feel that banking policy has been by and large sound, with some
reservations on mortgage lending marked below. Because of low leverage
ratios in the Armenian banking system, the amount of credit destruction that
has to occur as capital is destroyed by loan losses will be less than in the
West. (A bank with 10% capitalization rate has to reduce credit by $10 for
each dollar of bank capital destroyed; for a bank with 25% capitalization,
only $4 of credit is lost.) There is a good deal of variety in banks, however,
that is masked by using system amounts. Smaller banks tend to be less
profitable, and mergers may be prudent at this time.
 The mortgage market has been the subject of much work by the CBA, the
government, and donor organizations. Projects have tried to develop a
secondary mortgage market, and some have proposed mortgage-backed
securities. It has been quite a successful project thus far, with mortgages the
fastest growing asset on bank balance sheets. But this growth put more
dram-denominated assets onto banks, without any necessary increase in the
amount of dram deposits. If banks borrow in foreign currency and lend in
dram, they face substantial exchange rate risk. These considerations may
have put some additional strain on banks in the current recession.
Policymakers may wish to reconsider whether putting this additional
exchange rate risk onto the banks can and should be mitigated.
 Exchange rate policy changed this past March, with CBA choosing to return to
a flexible exchange rate regime. While this may make much sense in terms of
inflation control, it may increase the amount of exchange rate risk faced by
banks that borrow in dollars and lend in drams (whether encouraged by
banking policy or not.) Good control of inflation will be the best policy for
banks but, as we have seen in the last year, not all bank troubles begin with
inflation.
 Remittances, as we have seen, are a part of Armenia’s globalization policy.
The preponderance of emigration of labor to Russia and other CIS
destinations implies that Armenia’s exposure to Russian shocks will continue
to be the predominant source of external economic instability. But they
should not be seen as contributing to contagion and regulation of remittance
flows should continue to be light. Encouraging diversification of neighbors to
whom Armenian labor might emigrate would be somewhat helpful, but the
size and historical significance of the Russian economy is likely to favor it as
the Armenian destination for years to come. One could also consider how
Armenia manages its emigrant workers. Some countries have a more active
program for placement, for providing information to potential émigrés, and



for managing the return flow of workers and their remittances. The
Philippines provides but one example.
Trade, which all at this conference have said should stay open, should be seen
as trade both in outputs – goods and services – and in inputs – labor and
capital. As noted above, Russia’s decision to reverse the flow of work permits
to CIS migrant workers serves as protectionism of a different sort. Beyond
that, it is worth noting that Armenia’s trade patterns are still the product not
only of history but current impediments. The border to Turkey remains
closed; trade with Iran creates issues with western allies; Georgia’s political
uncertainties create problems as well. It would be worthwhile for
policymakers to think more about whether putting so many eggs in the
Russian basket is wise, and if not, what could be done to diversify trading
partners.
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